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patent rights.Recently,  a large number of papers have  established that financial  development  fosters
growth  and  that  a  country's  financial  development  is  related  to  its  institutional
characteristics,  including  its  legal  framework.  The  financial  development  and  growth
literature has established that finance matters  for growth both at the macro-economic  and
micro-economic  level  (King  and Levine  1993  and  Levine  1997).  The  law  and finance
literature  has found that financial  markets are better developed  in countries  with strong
legal  frameworks.  These well-developed  financial  markets make  it easier  for  firms to
attract  financing  for their investment  needs  (Rajan  and  Zingales  1998,  La Porta et  al.
1998,  Demirgui,-Kunt  and Maksimovic  1998).  Related  work has established  that  debt
structures  of firms  differ  across  institutional  frameworks  (Rajan  and  Zingales  1995,
Demirgfl9-Kunt  and Maksimovic  1999, and Booth et al. 2000).1
Thus far the literature has not paid much attention to differences across countries  in
terms of firms'  asset  structure,  i.e.,  differences  in the  allocation  of investible  funds  by
firms  across  various  types  of  assets.  However,  these  differences  are  large  as  well.
Demirgu,-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1999)  find  that  firns  in  developing  countries  have
higher proportions  of fixed  assets to total  assets and less intangible  assets than firms  in
developed countries. This is surprising as the literature  on firms' optimal capital structure
(Harris  and  Raviv  1991)  suggests  that  a  lack  of long-termn  financing  - typical  in  a
developing  country - would make it more difficult to finance fixed assets.  Why is it that
firms  in developing  countries  have more  fixed  assets?  Is it that  they need more  fixed
collateral  to attract  external  financing?  Or  does  the  preference  for  fixed  assets  and  a
corresponding  lower  share  of intangible  assets  arise  in countries  with  worse  property
' In particular,  it has been  established  that firms  in developing  countries have a smnaller  fraction  of their
total debt in  the form of long-term  debt.
2rights  because  the returns on  fixed  assets  are  easier to  secure  from  the firm's point of
view than the returns on intangible assets?  More generally,  what is the role of property
rights in terms of affecting investment patterns of finms?
In this paper, we empirically  explore the role of property rights  in influencing the
allocation  of investable  resources.  We  start  from  the well-established  proposition  that
greater financial  sector development  increases the availability  of external  resources  and
thereby enhances firm investment.  We also acknowledge  the literature demonstrating the
importance of a  good legal  framework  and well-established  property rights  for overall
economic growth.  In terms of channels through which property rights affect firm growth,
we argue that the degree  of property rights protection affects the allocation  of investable
resources.  At  the  firm  level,  we  can  use  the  term  property  rights  as refening  to  the
protection of entrepreneurial  and  other investment  in firm assets.  We argue that a firm
operating  in a market with weaker  property rights may be  led to invest  more in  fixed
assets relative to intangible assets  as it finds it relatively more difficult to secure returns
from intangible assets than from fixed assets.
The  argument goes as follows.  A firm is always  at risk of not getting the returns
from its assets (tangible  or intangible) due to actions by its own employees,  other firms,
or the  government.  For  the  firm's employees  and  other  firms  (in  particular,  powerful
competitors)  it is relatively easy to  steal the intangible  assets of a firm if property rights
are not secure.  In  a narrow sense,  this is because the value of many intangible  assets -
patents  (property  rights  to  inventions  and  other  technical  improvements),  copyrights
(property rights  to authors,  artists,  and composers),  and trademarks  (property rights  for
distinctive  commercial  marks  or  symbols)  - purely  derive  from  the  existence  of
(intellectual)  property rights.  Without  property rights protection,  employees  can simply
3walk away with many a firm's intangible assets and competitors can easily copy them. As
such,  property  rights  in  a  narrow  sense  are  very  important  for  securing  returns  to
intangible  assets.  Stealing  physical  property,  such  as  buildings  and  machinery,  in
contrast  is more  difficult,  particular  for  competing  firns,  even when  general  property
rights  are not secure.  In a broader sense therefore, property rights matter more to secure
returns from intangible assets than from tangible assets. Since there is no apparent reason
to expect that the risk of expropriation  by the government  is higher for tangible  assets
than for intangible assets, it follows that property rights matter more for intangible assets
than for tangible assets.  More generally,  we argue that the degree to which firms allocate
resources in an  optimal way will depend  on the strength of a country's property rights,
with the allocation effect being important for consequent firm growth.
Across countries, firm growth will also be affected by the development of financial
markets.  As  such,  there are  two effects to consider in a cross-country  study,  a finance
effect  and  an  asset  allocation  effect.  The  finance  effect will  determine  the  available
resources  for  investment  and thus  affect  firm  growth.  The  asset  allocation  effect  will
determine the efficiency of firm investment  and thus also  affect  growth.  We empirically
investigate  the  importance  of  the  finance  and  asset  allocation  effects  for  different
industries in a large number of countries.  We find less growth in countries  with a lower
level of financial development because firms  lack access to finance and thus underinvest.
And  in  countries  with  less  secure  property  rights,  there  is  less  growth  because  the
allocation  of firns'  investment  is  inefficient  as  firms  underinvest  in  intangible  assets.
Empirically,  the two  effects  are  equally  important  drivers of growth  in  sectoral  value
added.  The  results  are  robust  to  using  different  country  samples  and  estimation
techniques, including instrumental variables and variations  in country controls.
4The paper is structured as follows.  Section I reviews the related literature, develops
the finance and asset allocation effects,  and presents our methodology to separate the two
effects empirically.  Section II presents the data used in our empirical application.  Section
HI  presents  the  empirical  results  concerning  the relationships  between  growth  in value
added  and  the  finance  and  asset  allocation  effects.  Section  IV  presents  a  number  of
robustness tests.  Section V concludes.
I.  Related Literature and Hypothesis
Our work is related to several strands of literature.  The starting point is the work by King
and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998),  and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) that
has established  an  empirical  link  between  financial  development  and  economic  growth.
Also related is the law and finance  literature initiated by La Porta et al. (1997).2  The law
and  finance  literature  has  established  that  financial  sector  development  is  higher  in
countries with better legal  systems  and stronger  creditor rights  since such environments
increase the ability of lenders to collateralize their loans and finance firns.
The  second  strand  we  draw  on  is  the  capital  structure  literature  (Myers  1977,
Titman  and  Wessels  1988,  and  Harris  and  Raviv  1991).  This  literature  relates  firms'
liability structure to firm asset choices, among others. It has established that real, tangible
assets,  such  as  plant and  equipment,  can  support  more  debt  than  intangible  assets.  In
particular,  fixed assets can support more long-term  debt as they have greater liquidation
and collateralizable  value.  Holding  other  factors  constant,  debt  ratios will be  lower the
2  This  literature  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  the  institutional  framework  of a  country  and  its
financial development  (see also  La Porta  et al.  1998, Rajan and Zingales  1998, and Demirgac-Kunt  and
Maksimovic  1998).
5larger  the  proportion  of firm  values  represented  by  intangible  assets  (Myers  1977).
Bradley et al.  (1984) provide  empirical support for the argument that a larger amount of
intangible assets reduces the borrowing capacity of a firm.3
The third strand of literature relates to the role of property rights in affecting overall
investment  and investment patterns.  Besley (1995)  shows the role of property rights for
investment incentives  and provides  evidence of the importance of property rights in the
context of land ownership  by farmers in Ghana. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002)
show  for  a  sample  of firms  in post-communist  countries  that  weaker  property  rights
discourage  the  reinvestment  of  firn  earnings,  even  when  bank  loans  are  available,
suggesting  that secure property  rights  are both  a necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for
entrepreneurial  investment.  The role of property  rights in affecting  investment patterns
has also been acknowledged,  although less explicitly studied.  Mansfield (1995) hints that
there may be a relationship  between  protection of property  rights  and the allocation  of
investable  resources  between  fixed  and  intangible  assets.  Using  a  survey  of  firm
managers,  he states that  "most of the firms we contacted seemed to regard intellectual
property  rights  protection  to  be  an  important  factor"  ...  "[influencing]  investment
decisions".  Stem,  Porter  and  Furman  (2000)  show  that  the  strength  of  a  country's
intellectual  property  rights  affect  its innovative  capacity,  as measured  by the degree of
international  patenting.  In  developing  countries,  the  lower  degree  of investment  in
intangible assets may relate to the weaker protection of property rights.  More generally,
the institutional  economics literature (North  1990)  suggests  that investment  in particular
types of assets will be higher the more protected the property rights of the assets are.
3  Work  by Rajan  and Zingales  (1995)  and  Demirgii9-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1999)  confirms  that  debt
maturity and  asset structures for cross-sections  of countries are  related in this  way, with  firms with more
fixed assets being able to support a greater amount of long-term debt.
6Empirically,  these three  strands have not yet merged in investigating the effects of
institutions  on both  firm financing  and  asset  allocation,  and consequently  growth.  The
law  and  finance  literature has  already  established that  firms  in a  country with a better
legal  framework  and more developed  financial  markets find it  easier to attract  external
financing.  Empirical  investigation  of how a country's  property rights protection  affects
firms' asset allocation has not yet occurred. Here we want to test two hypotheses:  firms in
countries  with better  developed  financial  systems  will have more  access  to finance  and
will therefore be able to invest more overall;  and, firms in countries with better property
rights will  invest  more  efficiently  across  types of assets.  In  turn,  both aspects  will be
reflected in higher growth rates.
For our empirical test, we use the setup of Rajan and Zingales  (1998, RZ hereafter)
to assess the relationship between financial and legal development  and growth.4 Let there
be m countries,  each  indicated  by index  k,  and n  industries,  each indicated  by index j.
The RZ-model  then  relates the  growth  in real  value  added  in  a sector j  in  a particular
country k to  a number of country  and firm-specific variables.  In case of RZ, the specific
test  focuses  on  financial  development  and  the  argument  of RZ  is  that  financially
dependent  finns  can  be  expected  to  grow  more  in  countries  with  a  higher  level  of
financial development.  In addition to including country indicators and industry indicators,
they overcome some of the identification problems encountered in standard cross-country
growth regressions  by  interacting  a country  characteristic  (financial  development  of a
particular  country)  with an  industry  characteristic  (external  financial  dependence  of a
particular  industry).  This  approach  is  less  subject  to  criticism  regarding  an  omitted
4 Other papers that use this approach include  Cetorelli and Gambera (2001),  which investigates  the effects
of bank concentration on sectoral growth, and Fismnan  and Love  (2002a), which investigates  the  effects of
trade credit usage on sectoral growth.
7variable  bias  or  model  specification  than  traditional  approaches  and  allows  them  to
isolate  the  impact  of  financial  development  on  growth.  In  the  regression  results
explaining  sectoral  growth,  RZ  find  a  positive  sign  for  the  interaction  between  the
external financial dependence ratio and the level of financial development.  They also find
a  similar  effect  when  including  an  interaction  term  between  the  typical  external
dependence  variable  for  the  particular  sector  and  the  quality  of  a  country's  legal
framework.
The results of RZ provide support for the law and finance effect. We expand the RZ
model  to test for the asset allocation effect.  We add to the basic  model in RZ a variable
that is the interaction  of the typical ratio  for each industrial  sector of intangible-to-fixed
assets  and an  index of the strength of countries'  property rights.  We then test whether
industrial  sectors  that  typically  use  many  intangible  assets  grow  faster  (slower)  in
countries  with  more  (less)  secure  property  rights.  If intangible-intensive  sectors  grow
more in countries with better property rights, then we have indirect evidence that property
rights affect firms'  asset choices and consequently through that channel growth.  We also
perform  a  number  of robustness  tests  on  the  importance  of controlling  for  country-
specific  factors  and  using  instrumental  variables  to control  for  the  possible  (residual)
endogeneity of some variables.
In line with RZ, we use US firm data to construct proxies at the industry level for
the typical external  dependence  for a particular  industrial  sector and the typical ratio of
intangible-to-fixed  assets for a particular  industry. The presumption here is that the well-
developed  financial  markets  and  the well-protected  property  rights  in the U.S.  should
allow US  firms to achieve  the desired  financiai  and  asset  structures  for their respective
industrial  sector.  This  approach  offers  a way  to  identify the desired  extent  of external
8dependence and the optimal asset mix of an industry anywhere in the world.5 It assumes
that there are technological  and economic  reasons why some industries  depend more on
external  finance  and intangible  assets than others,  and that these  differences,  to a large
degree,  prevail  across  countries.  This  does  not mean  that  we  assume  a  sector  in  two
countries  with the same degree  of property  protection to have  exactly the same optimal
mix of intangibles  and tangible assets.  Local conditions such as growth opportunities  are
allowed  to  differ between  countries.  We  only assume  the rank  order  of optimal  asset
mixes across industries to be similar across countries. Furthermore, we explicitly conduct
tests for the importance of this assumption.
Following  RZ,  the  regressions  include  the  industry's  market  share  in  total
manufacturing in the specific country to control for differences in growth potential  across
industries.  Industries  with  large  market  shares  may  have  less  growth  potential  than
industries with small initial market shares when there is an industry-specific convergence.
The initial share may also help to control for other variations  between countries,  such as
in  their initial  comparative  advantage  among  certain  industries based  on factors  other
than financial development  and property rights protection.  Finally, in lines with RZ, we
use country and industry dummies.  The final specification is as follows:
GrowthJ,k  = Constant +  -Country indicators + 1 3
m+i  m+n  Industry indicators
+ ,8.+n+, (Industry j  share of manufacturing in country k in 1980)
+  m+n+ 2 *  (External dependence US industry j *  Financial development country k)  (1)
+ ,.+n+3,  (Intangible intensity US  industry j  *  Property rights country k)
+ 
6 j,k
5 The advantage  of this approach is that we do not need information on the actual asset mix for industries in
different  countries.  The comnparability of such data would be  limited as accounting practices,  in particular
with respect to intangible assets, differ greatly around the world.
9II.  Data
We  use  industry-specific  and  country-specific  data  from  a variety  of sources.  Table  1
presents  an  overview  of the variables  used  in the  empirical  analysis and  their sources.
Most of the  variables  are  self-explanatory  and  have  been  used  in  other  cross-country
studies of firm financing structures and firm growth.
In line  with RZ, we use  the ratio of private  credit  to  GDP  as proxy  for financial
development.  As proxies for the level of  protection of property rights, we use three broad
indexes of property rights, two indexes of intellectual property rights, as well as a specific
index of patent rights. These indexes of property rights come  from different sources, each
having some advantages and disadvantages.  Our main property rights index is the rating
of protection of property rights from the Index of Economic  Freedom constructed  by the
Heritage Foundation.  This is a relatively broad index of property rights, is available for a
large set of countries and has been used by other researchers  (for example,  Johnson et al.
1998,  and  La  Porta  et  al.  1999,  2002).  A  second  index  of property  rights  rates  the
protection of intellectual  property rights in particular by using data on the "Special  301"
placements of the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR).  "Special 301" requires
the  USTR  to identify  those  countries  that  deny adequate  and  effective  protection  for
intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable market access  for persons that rely
on intellectual  property protection.  Countries  can be placed  on different  lists depending
on their relative  protection  of intellectual  property.  For example,  countries  which have
the most  onerous  or egregious  acts,  policies  or practices  and  which  have  the  greatest
adverse impact  on relevant US products  are  designated "Priority Foreign Countries".  As
such, the index weights the degree of property rights protection with the economic  impact
10that protection deficiencies  have on US trade.  We use these qualifications  to construct an
index of intellectual property rights protection.  The third index is the patent rights index
constructed  by Ginarte  and  Park  (1997).  This  index  focuses more  specifically  on  the
protection of patents.  A fourth index  is the property rights index of the World Economic
Forum, which measures the general legal protection of private property in a country. The
fifth index is the intellectual property rights index of the World Economic Forum, which
measures  the protection of intellectual  property  in a country.  The two  World Economic
Forum indexes are only available for the year 2001. The sixth index is the property rights
index constructed by Knack and Keefer (1995)  using data from the International Country
Risk  Guide (ICRG).  This index measures property rights  in a broad  sense and includes
five  measures:  quality  of the  bureaucracy,  corruption  in  government,  rule  of  law,
expropriation risk and repudiation of contracts by the government.  Table 1 presents more
details on these six indexes of property protection.
Our  main  index  of protection  of property  rights  covers  the  1995-99  period;  the
Special  301 index of protection of intellectual property rights covers the 1990-99 period;
the  World  Economic  Forum  indexes  refer  to  2001;  and  the  Knack  and  Keefer  index
covers the  1982-95 period. The growth regressions,  however, include data for the period
1980-89, as in RZ.  Ideally, one would want to use property rights indexes for the period
1980-89 as well;  however,  this is not possible  for the property rights indexes available to
us due to data limitations.  The one exception  is the Ginarte  and Park patent rights index,
for which we do have data for the period  1980-89.  Therefore, this index does not suffer
from the non-overlapping  time period problem  and we can use the patent rights index for
the year  1980,  the beginning  of the period  1980-89,  in the regressions.  For the  other
indexes, we use index values as of their first available date.
11Although  the  indexes  of property  protection  are  from  different  sources  and  for
different  time  periods,  they  appear  quite  related  and  are  highly  positively  correlated
(Annex Table  1).  The correlation between our main property rights index and the other
five indexes of protection of (intellectual) property rights ranges,  for example,  from 0.49
to  0.78.  The  fact that the property  rights  indexes relate  to different time periods could
nevertheless  raise concerns in our specification,  in part because property rights may have
evolved  in response  to economic  performance.  We  believe  these  concerns to be  small,
most importantly,  because  measures  of institutional  frameworks  have  been  found  to be
stable over long periods of time  (Acemoglu,  Johnson  and Robinson 2001,  2002).  Also,
RZ  show  that the  sample  means  of the accounting  standards  variable  they use  do  not
differ significantly between  1983 and 1990.
This stability also applies to our property rights indexes, which do not change much
over the time for which they are available.  Table 2  shows that the mean property rights
index  for  countries  sampled  in  the  first  and  last  available  year  is  not  statistically
significantly different  for any of the three indexes.  Importantly, the sample mean of the
Ginarte  and Park patents  rights  index  - the only index  for which  we have data for  the
period 1980-89  - for countries  sampled in  1980 does not differ statistically significantly
from the sample mean in  1990 for the same set of countries.  In addition, we find that the
relative ordering of the different property rights indexes does not change much over time,
as the Spearman  rank order  correlations of the respective  indexes  are high.  A t-test of
independence  further  confirms  that  the  property  rights  indexes  in  the  first  and  last
available  year  are  not  independent.  As  a  further  robustness  check,  we  also  do  our
regressions  instrumenting  the  property  rights  indexes  with  variables  that  predate  the
12period  1980-89,  using the  methodology  used by Beck,  Levine  and  Loayza  (2000)  and
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
Table  3 presents  the summary statistics of the country-specific  variables  grouped
by  developing  and  developed  countries  (Annex  Table  2  presents  the  same  summary
statistics,  but  by individual  country).  We  only  use  the  developing  versus  developed
countries classification to illustrate the differences  in the various variables by institutional
settings. The country summary statistics show that, as a group, developing countries  have
less  developed  financial  systems,  weaker  law  and  order  systems,  worse  protection  of
(intellectual)  property rights, and fewer patents  per capita.  All variables  except  for the
stock market capitalization-to-GDP ratio and the accounting standards show a statistically
significant difference  between  the two  groups of countries.  Other work has documented
extensively  the  differences  in  the  degree  of law  and  order  between  developed  and
developing countries.  This difference  in legal frameworks partly relates  to the difference
in the  credit-to-GDP  ratio  between these  two  groups  of countries,  where  low contract
enforcement  environments  have  hindered  the  development  of  financial  systems  in
developing countries.
The degree  of financial  development  and the protection of property rights  tend to
go together and  are both related  to the overall  level of development  of the country.  As
such, analyzing  the differential  effects  of financial  development  and property rights  on
the level of external financing available  and the allocation of investment across  different
assets  could  be  difficult;  however,  the  correlation  between  the  two  concepts  is  not
perfect.  That  is,  there  exist  countries  with  good  property  rights  and  underdeveloped
financial  systems.  Chile,  for example,  scores  high on the protection  of property rights
(property  rights  index  equals  5)  but its  level  of financial  development  is only average
13(private credit-to-GDP  is 36 percent).  France,  on the other hand, has a well-developed
financial  system  (reflected  by a  level  of private  credit-to-GDP  of 54 percent)  but  the
protection  of its  property  rights  is  only  average  (with  a  property  rights  index  of 4).
Calculating  the  simple  correlation  between  the  property rights  index  and  the  level  of
financial  development,  0.59,  confirms  that the relationship  between  the two concepts  is
high but not perfect.  The  correlations  of the interaction  variables  are  even  less  perfect,
less than 0.20 (see further Annex Table 3).
Our dataset includes 45  countries.6 For the growth regressions,  as in RZ, we need
to  drop  the benchmark  country,  the  United  States,  and  we  are  therefore  left  with  44
countries.  As  we  collected  additional  data,  the  number  of countries  included  in  our
dataset somewhat exceeds that in RZ, who use data on 41  countries.  For robustness, we
also estimated the model using the subset of countries in RZ and results did not change.
Similarly to  RZ, we  construct  benchmark  data on  an  industry basis.  We  use  the
benchmark data from RZ for all of our industry variables, but add the intangible-to-fixed-
assets ratio.  We assume  that the intangible-to-fixed-assets  ratio for each  industry in the
U.S.  forms  a  good  benchmark  (similar  to  RZ  who  use  the  US  external  financial
dependence  ratio  as a benchmark).  We  refer to the ratio of intangible-to-fixed  assets  as
the intangible intensity.  In the same way RZ calculates the external financial dependence
ratios by industry, we calculate the intangible  intensity benchmark using Compustat-data
on US firms for the years 1980-89. We measure  intangibles by the net value of intangible
assets,  i.e.,  Compustat  item 33.  Generally,  intangibles  are  assets  that have no physical
6 The  countries  include Australia,  Austria,  Bangladesh,  Belgium, Brazil, Canada,  Chile,  Colombia, Costa
Rica, Denmark,  Egypt,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  India,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Italy,  Jamaica,  Japan,
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,  Netherlands,  New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,  Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal,  Singapore,  South Africa,  Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey,  United Kingdom,
United States, Venezuela,  and Zimbabwe.
14existence  in themselves but represent  rights to enjoy some privilege.  In Compustat,  this
item includes:  blueprints or building designs, patents,  copyrights, trademarks,  franchises,
organizational  costs,  client  lists,  computer software patent  costs,  licenses,  and goodwill
(except  on  unconsolidated  subsidiaries).  Intangibles  in  the  Compustat-data  excludes
goodwill on unconsolidated subsidiaries,  which are included in investments and advances
under the equity method (Compustat item 31). We measure tangibles by net fixed assets,
i.e.,  Compustat item 8.  This represents net property, plant and equipment, which equals
gross  property, plant and  equipment  (Compustat  item  7)  less accumulated  depreciation,
depletion and amortization (Compustat item 196).
Table  4  reports  the  intangible  intensity  benchmarks  for  US  firms  in  different
industrial  sectors on a two-digit SIC  level.  The total number  of firms used to calculate
these benchmarks is 5,241.  The average intangible intensity ratio during the 1980s for US
manufacturing  firms  is  77  percent.  The  variation  of the  intangible  intensity  across
industries  is  large:  it  ranges  from  as  low  as  2.0  percent  for  the  petroleum  and  coal
products industry to as high as 454 percent for the printing  and publishing industry.  The
variation concurs with notions of what constitute relatively capital-intensive  versus more
knowledge-intensive  industries. The stone, clay, glass and concrete products industry,  for
example,  relies  mainly  on  fixed  assets  for  production,  as  would  be  expected  as  the
technology used in this sector is well-established  and embodied in the fixed assets. It has
an intangible intensity ratio of 5 percent.  The chemical  and allied products industry and
the electrical and electronic industry,  in contrast, rely heavily on intangible assets, such as
patents and licenses,  as inputs.  It has an intangible intensity ratio of 77 percent.  The data
show that the various technical and economic reasons that make various types of products
require different input mixes can be benchmarked  well at the industry level.
15III.  Empirical Results
In  this  section,  the  results  of the  regression  model  of section  I  are presented.  The
dependent variable is the growth in real  value added in a particular sector in a particular
country  over  the  1980-89  period.  The  basic  regression  specification  is  OLS  and  the
results are  presented in Table 5.  We find that industrial sectors that rely relatively more
on external  finance  develop disproportionately  faster in countries  with better developed
financial  markets because the coefficient for the interactive variable  credit-to-GDP  times
external  financial  dependence  is statistically significant (at the one percent level, column
1).  Hence,  consistent  with  the  findings  of  RZ  we  find  that  financial  development
facilitates  economic  growth through  greater  availability  of extemal  financing.  As noted
by Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and others, the quality of the legal system influences
financial  sector  development  and  overall  growth.  Interacting  the  external  financial
dependence  variable  with  the index  of the  quality of the legal  framework  used by La
Porta et al. (1998), instead of the financial development variable,  also leads to a positive
coefficient  (not reported).  The regression  result confirms  the law and finance  view that
increased availability of extemal financing and better legal systems enhance  firmn growth.
In terms of the asset allocation effect, we find that industrial sectors using relatively
more intangible assets develop faster in countries with better protection of property rights
because  the  coefficient  for  the  interactive  variable  property  rights  times  intangible
intensity is statistically significant  and positive (column 2).  Hence, better property rights
16facilitate  economic  growth  as they favor  growth  through better  asset  allocation,  i.e.,  in
firms that would naturally choose a higher share of investment in intangible assets.7
The  asset  allocation  effect on  growth appears  to be in addition to the increase  in
finn growth  due  to greater  extemal  financing  since,  in the regressions  where  both  the
external  financial dependence  and the intangible intensity variables  are included (column
3), both interactive variables  are statistically significant.  Additionally,  the coefficients in
these  regressions  for both  effects  are  of similar  magnitudes  as  in  the  two  regressions
where  each  of them  was  included  separately  (columns  1-2),  suggesting  that  the  two
variables measure complementary effects.8
The  effects  of external  financial  development  and  property  protection  on  firm
growth  are  not  only  both  statistically  significant  but  are  also  equally  economically
important.  We can use the regression coefficient  estimates of Table 5 to infer how much
higher the growth rate of an industry  at the  75th percentile  of intangible-intensity  would
be compared to an industry at the 25th percentile  level when the industries are located in a
country at the  75th  percentile of property protection  rather than  in a country  at the 25th
percentile.  The  industry  at the  75th  percentile,  Instruments  and related products,  has  an
intangible intensity ratio of 0.90. The industry at the 25th percentile, Textile mill products,
has  an  intangible  intensity  ratio of 0.21.  The country  at the  7 5th  percentile of property
protection  has  a  value  of 5  for  the property  rights  index  and  the  country  at  the  25'h
7  Exclusion  of sectors  with  relatively  high  estimated  usage  of  intangible  assets,  such  as  Printing  and
publishing  and/or  Miscellaneous  manufacturing  industries,  does  not  qualitatively  alter  the  results  (not
reported).
8 The  two  interacted  variables,  external  fuiancial  dependence  and  intangible  intensity  interacted  with
financial  development  and  property  rights  indexes,  do  appear  to  measure  different  concepts  as  the
correlation  between  these  variables  is low.  The  correlation  between  the  external  financial  dependence
variable  interacted with  the financial  development measure and the intangible intensity measure interacted
with the property rights index is 0.149.  Similar correlations  are  found when the other four property rights
indexes are used (see Annex Table 3).
17percentile  a value of 3. The estimated  coefficient  for the interaction  term in model  2 of
Table 5 equals 0.103 and we set the industry's initial share of manufacturing  at its overall
mean. The regression coefficient estimates therefore predict the difference in growth rates
between  the  75 th  and  25th  percentile  intangible  intensive industry to be  1.4 percent per
year higher in a country with a property rights index of 5 compared  to an index of 3. For
comparison,  the average growth rate is 3.4 percent per year. Therefore,  a differential  rate
of 1.4 percent due to an improvement  in the property rights index from 3 to 5 represents  a
large increase.
The  effect  of  financial  development  on  differential  real  firm  growth  can  be
calculated  in  a similar  way using  the estimated  coefficient  for  the interaction  term  of
model 1 in Table 5 of 0.140.  The coefficient estimate predicts the difference between the
growth rate of the 7 5 th and 25th percentile external financial dependence industry to be 1.4
percent higher in a country at the 75th percentile of financial development compared to at
the 25'h percentile.9 Thus, the effects of property protection  and financial development on
differential  firm  growth  are  not  only both  statistically  significant,  but  also  of similar
economic  importance.  In  other  words,  the  asset  allocation  effect  is  economically  as
important as the finance effect.
Thus  far,  our  specifications  have  focused on the differential  effect  on  growth  of
property rights  across  industries with different  asset  mixes (captured  by the interaction
term of property rights and the intangible-intensity  measure).  To  avoid possible biases
caused by any omitted country-specific  regressors, we have included country dummies to
9 RZ  used  the  same  approach  to  compute  the  effect  of financial  development  on differential  real  firm
growth.  Our estimated effect differs somewhat from the differential growth rate effect estimated in RZ, 1.3
percent,  because  our  sample  is slightly  larger  and  because  we  use private  sector credit  instead of total
capitalization as our measure of financial development.
18capture  any institutional or other differences,  such  as comparative  advantage  or general
level of development,  affecting growth.  Since we are less interested in the importance of
general country differences,  we use this approach rather than a vector of specific country
control variables.  Still, the use of country dummies could introduce a misspecification to
the extent that any omitted institutional  differences  important  for growth are  correlated
with our two interaction variables. Examples of such country-specific  variables that have
been used in the general  growth  literature  include, besides  financial  depth and property
rights,  the  level  of per  capita  GDP,  human  capital,  and  other  institutional  variables
(Romer 1990,  Barro 1991, and Levine and Zervos 1998,  among others).  Furthermore, we
want to analyze  the first-order country  effects of property rights  to investigate  whether
property rights affect firm growth mainly through the asset  allocation channel or as well
in  any  other ways.  We  therefore  replace  our  country  dummies  with country-specific
institutional  and other variables  and thus perform  a robustness  check on whether any of
our earlier results are affected if we control in other ways for country differences.
We start by documenting the fact that the effects of better property rights on growth
work  mostly through  improved  asset  allocation  as  opposed  through,  for  example,  an
improvement in the overall business  environment  increasing  growth  opportunities.  We
illustrate this by including in our basic regression specification  the property rights index
(and private credit-to-GDP)  directly in addition to the interacted variable.  The results are
reported in column 4 of Table 5, where we exclude country dummies.  We do not find a
direct,  statistically  significant  effect  of the  quality  of a  country's  property  rights  on
industrial  sector growth.  Most importantly,  including  the property rights  index directly
does not change  the magnitude  or the significance of the coefficients  for the interaction
variables  in  any  meaningful  way.  Both  the  financial  dependence  and  the  asset  mix
19interaction  variables remain statistically significant and neither change  much in terms of
magnitude.  This  suggests  that the major effect  of improved  property  rights on sectoral
growth  operates  through  improvements  in  asset  allocation  and  that  the  interaction
variable  does  not  capture  any  general  effects  of,  for  example,  improvements  in  the
business environment  leading to greater growth opportunities.
For other country-specific  variables,  we  use the ratio  of private  credit to GDP  in
1980,  stock  market capitalization  over GDP  in  1980, a measure of the  level of human
capital  in  1980,  a measure  of the quality  of the  legal  system,  an  accounting  standards
indicator,  and the logarithm of per-capita income in 1980.  RZ and Cetorelli and Gambera
(2001) have also used these variables in the same model.  We expect a positive effect on
growth  of private  credit  to  GDP  and market  capitalization  to  GDP  as  proxies  for  the
development  of  the  banking  system  and  stock  market  respectively,  and  financial
development more  generally.  The level of human capital is measured  as the average of
the years  of schooling  attained  by the population  over  25  years  of age  in  1980  (as in
Barro and Lee  1993)  and is expected to have a positive effect on growth in value added.
The quality of the legal system is measured by the law and order tradition variable of La
Porta  et  al.  (1998)  and  is  also  expected  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  growth.  The
accounting  standards  indicator  is  an  index  reflecting  the  quality of accounting  and  is
taken from RZ.  This variable is also expected to have a positive effect on growth since it
proxies for the quality of information investors have regarding  firm and  firms regarding
investment  prospects.  Per capita  GDP is included to capture the convergence  effects of
the economy  as a whole  to a long-run  steady state  and  is  expected  to have  a negative
coefficient  (see,  among  others,  Barro  1991).  The model  continues  to  include  industry
dummies to control for any sector-specific  effects  and the property rights  indexes.  Since
20the country variables  included in the two interaction termns - private credit to GDP and an
index of property rights  - are  now also part of the country  controls,  we can assess both
the  overall  effect  of  financial  development  and  property  protection  on  value  added
growth as well as the finance and asset allocation  effects captured by the two interaction
terms.  Note that data on accounting standards  is missing for some countries, reducing the
sample of countries to 33.
The results of this specification  are reported in column 5 of Table 5.  Except for the
human capital variable,  the country  controls have the expected relationships  with growth.
The  direct  effect  of the  quality  of property  rights  on  growth  remains  insignificant,
however,  which suggests  that better  property  rights of themselves  do not translate  into
higher  growth  rates  of  sectoral  value  added.  The  depth  of the  financial  systems  -
measured by private  credit to GDP and the size of the stock  market as a ratio to GDP -
has  a positive and statistically  significant  influence  on growth in sectoral  value  added.
The  degree  of human capital  in the country,  proxied by the average  years of schooling
attained  by the population  over 25  years of age,  and the degree  to which the rule of law
applies  do  not have  a statistically  significant  effect  on  growth  in  sectoral  value  added.
The accounting index, however, is statistically significantly positive. The general level of
development, proxied by the log of income per capita, has a negative sign, confirming the
convergence effect.
The focus of our attention, the interaction between property rights and the allocation
of resources,  is very robust to these changes  in model  specification.  The  coefficient  on
the  interaction  term  between  the  property  rights  indexes  and  the  intangible-intensity
measure  remains positive  and statistically significant  in both specifications.  The size of
the  coefficient  is  also  only  somewhat  less  from  those  in  the  models  with  country
21dummies,  and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the one percent level. The
general  result on the importance of the asset allocation  effect is thus not altered. Also, the
interaction  term  between  financial  development  and  extemal  financial  dependence
remains  statistically significant  positive. The regression  results in columns 4  and 5 thus
show  that the effect of property rights on growth  operates  in an important way through
asset allocation, and not through a first order effect on growth.
Another  concern is that the quality of property rights is affected by the investment
behavior of firms  and the resulting  growth patterns.  At the macro-level,  countries  that
grow faster may demnand  greater property rights protection as a larger share of economic
output derives from more property rights' intensive investments.  At the more micro-level,
sectors that are more dependent on property rights may seek a higher degree of protection
of property  rights  relevant  to  their  industry.  Due  to  these  and  other  concems  about
potential  endogeneity,  we  instrument  the  property  rights  variable  with  a  number  of
predetermined  institutional  variables.  Following  RZ,  we  use  the  colonial  origin  of a
country's legal system (indicating whether the legal origin is English, French, German, or
Scandinavian)  as reported in La Porta et al.  (1998) as one instrument.  As also shown by
La  Porta  et  al.  1998,  legal  origin  tends  to  have  a  long  lasting  effect  on  a  country's
institutional structure,  whereas the legal origin of a country is largely determined  by the
country colonizing it.  As such, legal origin is a good instrumental variable  and has been
used in  several  other papers.  Following  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  (2001),  we
also use the settler mortality rate of European bishops,  soldiers  and sailors  stationed in
colonies in the  17th,  18th and  19th century as an instrument.  As argued by Acemoglu  et al.
(2001),  the  willingness  of  colonizing  powers  to  settle  and  develop  long-lasting
institutions  depended  greatly  on  the  ability  of colonizers  to  survive  physically.  They
22show  that the settler mortality rate is a good instrumental  variable  for past institutional
characteristics  which  last  into  today  (in  their  application,  the  particular  institutional
characteristic  is  the  risk of expropriation  of private  property).  We  do  not have  settler
mortality rates for European  countries,  that is the colonizing countries themselves.  Since
the European countries had  the institutions which they were exporting to their colonies,
we set their mortality rates to zero to account for this.
The  instrumental  variables (IV) results based on  the specification  of column 2 are
presented in columns 6-8, using respectively only legal origin, mortality rates, or both as
instruments.  The  results  are  very  robust  to the  use  of instruments.'0 We  again  find  a
statistically significant effect of property rights on growth in sectoral value added through
the asset allocation  of resources.  Interestingly, the magnitude  of the coefficients  for the
interaction  variable  increases  when  using  mortality  rates  as  an  instrumental  variable
(columns  7  and  8).  Next,  we  re-estimate  the  regression  model  in  column  3  using
instrumental variables. Following Beck et al. (2000) we use legal origin as an instrument
for  financial  development  today  (as measured  by private  credit-to  GDP).  In  line with
Acemoglu  et  al. (2001)  we use settler mortality as instrument  for property rights  today.
The results  are presented  in column  (9)  and confirm our previous findings,  i.e., that the
protection  of private property has  a statistically  significant  effect on growth  in sectoral
value added through the asset allocation of resources.' 1
As  an  additional  investigation  into  the  channels  through  which  financial
development  and  property  rights  affect  firm  growth,  and  following  RZ,  we  analyze
1°  The  first-stage  regressions  show  a  strong  relationship  between  the  instrumented  variables  and  the
potentially  endogenous  variables,  i.e.,  between  settler  mortality and legal  origin  and property rights  and
financial development,  private credit-to GDP, today (not reported).
" The  results presented in Table  5  are based on all available data (up to 44  countries).  For robustness,  we
re-estimated  the regression  models using  the subset of 41  countries used in RZ, which implies  excluding
Indonesia,  Jamaica,  and Nigeria.  The results are very similar to those in Table 5 (not reported).
23whether  industries  in  countries  with  better  financial  development  and  property  rights
grow  faster because  new  establishments  are  added  to  the industry  or because  existing
establishments grow  faster.  There  are two reasons why it is interesting to decompose  the
effects of access to financing and asset allocation  in terms of number and average size of
firms.  First,  highlighted by RZ,  the  creation  of new  establishments  is more likely  to
require external  finds, while the expansion of existing establishments  may more easily
rely  on  internal  funds.  Thus,  the  effect  of  financial  development  could  be  more
pronounced  for new firms than  for the growth of existing  firms.  Second,  new firms  are
often  set  up in reaction  to  and  to take  advantage  of new  technological  developments,
while established  firms  tend to grow  through  expansion  of scale, perhaps  also because
they  are slower in reacting to new  developments.1 2 Furthermore,  existing firms  may be
able to preserve  the value of their assets in ways other than resorting to formal property
rights  (for  example,  using their name  recognition,  distribution  or  supply  networks,  or
general  economic  and political  influence).  Thus, the importance  of property  rights that
protect  the  returns  to  (new)  technology  and  help  assure  a  good  allocation  of  an
economy's  overall  resources might be more pronounced  for the emergence  of new firms
than for the growth of existing firms.
As before,  we  follow  RZ  and use  data derived  from  the UN  Industrial  Statistics
Yearbook database for the growth in the number of establishments and the growth  in the
average  size of existing establishments.  The  growth in the number of establishments  is
calculated by RZ as the logarithm of the number of end-of-period  establishments less the
logarithm  of the  number  of beginning-of-period  establishments.  The  average  size  of
12  In  fact,  many  new  firms that  take  advantage  of new  technological  developments  are  spun off  from
existing frms that have developed some elements of these new technologies.
24establishments in the industry is calculated by dividing the value added in the industry by
the  number  of establishments,  with  the  growth  in  average  size  again  defined  as  the
difference in logarithms.  RZ report that in their sample of countries roughly two-thirds of
the  growth  in  value-added  results  from  an  increase  in  the  average  size  of existing
establishments,  while  the  remaining  one-third  is accounted  for  by an  increase  in  the
number of establishments.
We use  the  same  specification  as  for our basic regression  but with  the growth in
number of establishments or the growth in average  size as the dependent variable instead
of the growth in total value added by sector. As Table  6 indicates,  the  external  financial
dependence  interacted  with the financial  development  variable is statistically significant
in explaining both the growth in the number of establishments  and the growth in average
firm  size.  This contrasts  with RZ  who do  not find  any statistical  significance,  perhaps
because they use accounting  standards  as a measure for financial development  (see their
Table  7)  rather  than  private  credit  to  GDP  and  do  not  include  the  asset  allocation
interaction variable.
Interestingly,  the  asset  allocation  variable  interacted  with  the  property  rights
variable  is only significant  when explaining the growth in the number of establishments
and  not  when  explaining  the  growth  in  the  average  size  of  firms.  This  finding  is
consistent  across  all  of our  measures  of property  rights  (not  reported).  It is  also  not
affected by using as instrumental variable either legal origin or settler mortality (columns
3-8).  It suggests, in terms of affecting growth through asset allocation, that the protection
of  property  rights  is  most  important  through  stimulating  the  growth  of  new
establishments.  Well-protected  property  rights  can  thus  indirectly  influence  growth  by
allowing  new  firms  to  come  to  market  in  those  industries  that  typically  rely  less  on
25tangibles  in  their  optimal  production  mix.  For  established  firms  relying  more  on
intangible  inputs,  growth  seems  less  affected  by the  strength  of property rights  in  the
country.  This may be because  such  firms have  other means  of protecting  their returns
from investments.
IV.  Further robustness tests
We have already shown that the results are robust to different control variables, the use of
instrumental variables  and changes  in the sample of countries. We next present evidence
that the results are  also robust to the particular  measure of protection of property rights
chosen,  to alternative means  of controlling  for country-differences,  and to differences  in
growth opportunities  related to the level of general development.
First, we use the five alternative measures  of the degree to which countries  protect
property rights:  "Special  301",  the  patent  rights  index of Ginarte  and Park  (1997),  the
property rights index  and  the intellectual  property  rights index of the World Economic
Forum  and  the  property  rights  index  of  Knack  and  Keefer  (1995).  The  results  are
presented in Table 7 and are very similar to those of Table 5. Both with and without the
interaction  term  between  financial  development  and  external  dependence,  we  find
statistically  significant  coefficients  on  the  interaction  termn  between  the  intangible-
intensity measure and all of the five alternative property rights measures.  The results with
the alternative  measures of the degree of property rights protection  are also robust to the
use of legal origin and European settler mortality as instruments (not reported).
Second,  we  want  to  investigate  whether  growth  opportunities  differ  across
industries  and countries  in such  a way that they confound the relationships between  our
26interaction variables  and growth in sectoral value added.  In particular, it is possible that
the  external  financial  dependence  and  asset  mix  variables  are  proxies  for  growth
opportunities  at  the  sectoral  level.  Provided  that  financial  development  is  high  and
property  rights  are  protected,  it may  not be those  industries  with  a particular  external
financial  dependence  or intangibles  intensity that grow fast,  but rather  those with better
growth  opportunities.  If these  growth  opportunities  happen  to  be  correlated  with  our
financial  development  and property  rights variables,  then  a bias  in  the estimations  can
arise.  In particular,  countries  with  similar levels  of financial  development  or property
rights may experience the same growth patterns across industries because their firms face
similar  patterns  of  growth  prospects,  not  because  their  levels  of  financial  sector
development  or quality of property rights protection imply a greater supply of resources
for firms  or a better  allocation of resources  by firns.  Correspondingly,  countries with
different  levels of financial  development  or property  rights may have different  growth
opportunities and consequently grow differently,  not because of differences in the supply
of external financing or the protection of property rights.
In a recent paper,  Fisman and Love (2002b) explore this hypothesis  using the RZ-
model,  focusing  on financial  development.  They use the  actual  US sales  growth at the
sectoral level as a measure for sectoral growth opportunities at a global level.  When they
substitute  in the  interaction  term  the  industry's  actual  sales growth  for  the  industry's
external  financial  dependence  ratio,  they  find a positive  coefficient  for this  interaction
variable.  Furthermore, when including both the old and new interaction variable,  i.e., the
industries'  external  financial dependence  times  countries'  financial development  as well
as  the  actual  sales  growth  times  countries'  financial  development,  they  find  that  the
external  financial dependence  variable is no longer statistically significant.  This suggests,
27if indeed actual US  sales growth rates are a good proxy for (global) growth opportunities,
that it is the sirnilarity (or difference)  in growth opportunities  for countries at similar (or
different)  levels  of  financial  development  which  leads  to  the  positive  relationship
between  growth  and  the  interaction  variable  external  financial  dependence  times
countries'  financial sector development.
A  similar possibility may arise with respect to the asset  allocation hypothesis  and
our asset mix variable.  If growth opportunities  systematically vary across countries with
the degree of property rights protection, then a statistically significant coefficient  for our
interaction  variable  could be inaccurately  interpreted  as support  for the asset  allocation
hypothesis.  To  investigate  this possibility,  we  use  the same  approach  as  Fisman  and
Love.  Specifically,  we  interact  both the  extemal  financial  development  and  property
rights  variables  with  the  US  sectoral  sales  growth  rates  and  include  these  two  new
interaction variables  in the regressions.  The columns 2-4 in Table 8 show the results of
adding the interacted US  sales growth  variable in this way to the model, with column  1
repeating the results of column 3 of Table 5. Column 2 confirms the result of Fisman and
Love,  that  is,  the interaction  term between  financial  development  and US  sales growth
"dominates"  the  interaction  term between  financial  development  and extemal  financial
dependence  in  terms  of  sectoral  growth,  as  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term
financial  development  and  extemal  financial  dependence  is  no  longer  statistically
significant.  In Column 3 we add the interaction variable between property rights and US
sales  growth.  Although this  new interaction  variable  is also  statistically significant,  our
main result - a positive relationship between sectoral growth and the interaction variable
property rights  and  asset  mix - is robust  to  this  change  in  specification,  although  the
statistical  significance  for our main result decreases  somewhat.  When we  add both new
28interaction  variables,  i.e.,  between  US  sales  growth  and  financial  development  and
between  US  sales growth  and  property rights,  to the  model (column  4),  our main result
still  holds,  but  the  RZ  and  Fisman  and  Love  variables  are  no  longer  statistically
significant. This suggests that the asset allocation effect remains an important explanation
of firm growth.
The measure of growth opportunities  used in Fisman and Love, i.e.,  the actual sales
growth at the sectoral  level, is an ex-post measure.  It is therefore highly correlated with
actual  growth  in value  added,  our dependent  variable,  and as  such may not  be the best
measure to use for growth opportunities and could explain the reduced  significance of the
interaction variables  in columns  3 and 4. As an  alternative,  more  forward-looking  proxy
for growth opportunities, we use Tobin's Q ratio, i.e., the ratio of the market value of the
firm to the book value of its assets.  We use Compustat  data to construct  the industry-level
median of the time-average Tobin's Q of US firms during the period  1980-89.  The results
of using this alternative  measure of growth  opportunities  in the interaction  variables  are
presented in columns 5-7 of Table  8. In contrast to the actual sales growth measure, we
find that the interaction variables with Tobin's  Q do not enter significantly  in any of the
regressions,  showing  that  results  are  dependent  on  the  proxy  used  for  growth
opportunities.  Our  main  result  is  strengthened,  however,  as  the  coefficients  for  the
interaction variable  property rights  and  asset mix become more  statistically  significant.
This suggests that growth  opportunities,  as measured by firms'  Tobin's  Q, do not vary
across countries in such a systematic  way with the degree of property rights protection as
to  affect  the  relationship  between  property  rights  and  actual  growth,  through  asset
allocation.
29As a third robustness test, we investigate whether using US sectoral data biases our
results in  some way.  It could be  the case,  for example,  that investment opportunities  in
poorer  countries  are  different  from  those  in the U.S.  due to differences  in the  general
level  of a country's  development rather than differences  in property rights.  For a poor
country with the same property rights as a rich country, for example, the asset mix across
sectors  variable  may  not  relate  in  the  same  way  to  relative  growth  rates  as  growth
opportunities  differ because  of its general  lower level of development.  Any relationship
between growth and our interaction variable property rights times asset mix may then be
spurious  as  it  reflects  differences  in growth  opportunities,  and not  the  asset  allocation
effect.  We test  for  this possibility  by  adding  an  interaction  variable  between  the  US
sectoral  asset  mix  and countries'  per capita  GDP to the regression.  We use the level  of
per capita GDP  as a measure  of the overall  level of a country's  economic  development
and  of corresponding  country-level  investment  opportunities.  The  same  robustness  test
was performed by RZ, but then interacting external  dependence  with per capita GDP.  If
investment  opportunities  relate  systematically  to  a country's  level  of development  and
affect  the ability  of sectors  with  different  asset  mix to  grow,  rather  than  a  country's
property rights affecting growth  through the asset mix chosen,  then this new interaction
variable should be significant  and our old interaction  variable no longer.  Controlling for
differences  in the level of development  in this way does not alter our main result  as the
new interaction  variable  is not statistically  significant  while our old interaction variable
still is (column 8 in Table  8).  Thus, variations in property rights across countries  leading
to different  growth patterns  do not seem to be  due to  simple  differences  in investment
opportunities  related to level of development, but rather  to differences  in the  asset mix
chosen in response to variations in property rights.
30As  an  alternative  robustness  test  along  the  same  lines,  we  test  whether,  for
countries  with the  same  level  of property  rights,  investment  opportunities  differ  in  a
systematic  way with income  levels  such as to confound  the relationship  between assets
mix  and growth.  If investment opportunities  across sectors  do not vary in a systematic
way with income level, then for the same level of property rights we should not find  an
effect across countries of the income level variable interacted with the asset mix variable.
Columns  9-11  in  Table  8  show  the  results  of regressions  for  three  subsamples  of
countries with each the same degree of protection of property rights (as measured by our
main  property  rights  index),  but  different  levels  of  per  capita  GDP.  Using  this
specification, we do not find an income level effect since the coefficients  for the variable
that is the interaction between per capita GDP  and asset mix  are insignificant in each of
the three cases.
V.  Conclusions
Countries  differ  from  each  other  in many  ways.  Two  aspects  are  the  degree  of their
financial  sector development  and the quality of their property  rights. This paper  argues
that the existence of an  environment with poorly developed  financial  systems and weak
property rights has two effects  on firms:  first,  it reduces the access of firms  to external
financing;  and,  second,  it  leads  firms  to  allocate  resources  in  a  suboptimal  way.  The
importance of the lack of financing effect has already been shown in the law and finance
literature.  We  investigate the importance of property  rights for finn growth by studying
its  impact  on  firms'  allocation  of  investable  resources.  We  show  that  the  effect  of
insecure  property  rights  on  the  asset  mix  of  firns,  the  asset  allocation  effect,  is
31economically  as important  as  the  lack  of financing  effect  as it  impedes  the growth  of
firms to the same quantitative magnitude.  Furthermore,  the asset allocation  effect seems
to be particularly important in hindering the growth of new firms.
While we use the ratio of tangibles and intangible assets as a measure of asset mix,
the implications of our results  likely go beyond this particular asset  choice  and indicate
that  an  efficient  allocation  of firm  resources  can be more  generally  impeded  by weak
property rights.  Our results  suggest that the degree to which firms allocate resources  in
an optimal  way will  depend on the strength of a country's  property rights  and  that the
allocation  effect is an important channel  of the effect of property rights on firm growth.
Thus,  our  results  have  the important  policy  implication  that,  equally  important  as  the
establishment of a good financial  system, requiring in turn a functioning legal system, is
assuring  the  protection  of returns  to  different  type  of assets.  To  the  extent  that  the
emergence of the "new economy"  has increased the economic returns to assets on which
yields are more difficult to  secure, then our results would even underestimate  the overall
costs  of  weak  property  rights.  If indeed  new  economy  assets  and  future  growth
opportunities are more related to intangible assets, then any underallocation of investable
resources  towards  intangible  assets  is likely to  impede  the future  growth of firms  and
economies more generally even more so going forward.
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35Table I  The Variables
This table describes the variables collected  for our study. The first column gives the names of the variable as we use it.
The second column describes the variable and provides the source from which it was collected.
Variable  Description
Property  A rating of property rights in each country (on a scale from I to 5). The more protection private property receives, the
(Freedom)  higher the score.  The score is based, broadly,  on the degree of legal  protection of private property,  the probability that the
govemment  will expropriate private property, and the country's legal protection to private property. The index equals the
median rating for the period  1995-1999. Source: The Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation.  We
reversed the original order of the index.
Intellectual  An index of intellectual property rights (on a scale from I to 5). The more protection private property receives,  the higher
Property (Special  the score.  The index  is calculated  using the "Special 301"  placements of Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR).
301)  Special  301  requires the USTR to identify those countries that deny adequate and effective protection  for intellectual
property rights or deny fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual property protection. Countries
which have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies or practices and which have the greatest adverse  impact on relevant
US products are designated "Priority Foreign  Countries". Countries can also be placed on other lists. We assign the
following ratings:  I=Priority foreign countries; 2=306 Monitoring;  3=Priority  Watch List; 4=Watch List; 5=Not listed. The
index equals the median rating for the period 1990-1999.  Source: Intemational  Intellectual  Property Alliance.  Original
source: USTR.
Patent rights (GP)  An index of patent rights  (on a scale from 0 to 5) in 1980. The more protection patents receive, the higher the score.  The
index criteria are: coverage, membership,  duration, enforcement and loss of rights. Source:  Ginarte and Park (1997).
Property (WEF)  An index of property  rights in each country (on a scale from I to 7). The more protection private property receives, the
higher the score.  I indicates that assets are poorly delineated and not protected by law, while 7 indicates that assets are
clearly delineated and protected by law.  Source: Global Competitiveness  Report, World Economic Forum.
Intellectual  An index of intellectual  property rights in each country (on a scale from I to 7). The more protection intellectual  property
property (WEF)  receives, the higher the score.  I indicates that intellectual property protection  is weak or non-existent, while 7 indicates  that
intellectual property protection  is equal to the world's most stringent.  Source: Global Competitiveness  Report, World
Economic Forum.
Property (ICRG)  A measure of property rights in each country (on a scale from 0 to 10). Average between 1982  and 1995. The more
protection private property  receives, the higher the score. The score is based on the average of five measures: quality of the
bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation  risk and repudiation  of contracts by the government.
Original source:  Intemational Country Risk Guide. Taken from  Knack and Keefer (1995).
Private credit  Private Credit divided by GDP in 1980.  Source:  RZ and Intemational  Financial Statistics, IMF.
Market cap  Stock market capitalization divided by GDP in  1980. Source:  RZ.
Accounting  Accounting standards in  1983. Scale from 0 to 90, with higher scores indicating  more disclosure. Source: Center for
Intemational  Financial Analysis and Research.  Taken  from RZ.
Human capital  Human capital is the average for 1980 of the years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age. Source:
Barro and Lee (1993).
Rule of Law  Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Average of the months of April and October of the monthly  index
between  1982 and 1995.  Scale from 0 to  10, with lower scores for less tradition  for law and order. Source:  Intemational
Country Risk Guide.  Taken from  La Porta et al. (1997).
Legal origin  Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial  Code of each country. There are four possible origins: (I)
English Common law; (2) French  Commercial  Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial  Code.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
European settler  European settler mortality rate, measured  in terms of deaths per annum per  1000 "mean strength".  Source: Acemoglu,
mortality  Johnson and Robinson (2001).
GDP per capita  The logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980. Source: World Development Indicators,  World Bank.
Growth in value  Real annual growth in value  added by ISIC sector over the period  1980-89.  Source:  UN. Taken  from RZ.
added
Growth in average  Growth in average size by ISIC sector over the period 1980-89. Source:  UN. Taken  from RZ.
size
Growth in number  Growth in number of establishments by ISIC sector over the period  1980-89.  Source: UN.  Taken from RZ.
Fraction of sector  Fraction of ISIC sector  in value added of total manufacturing  sector in 1980. Source:  UN. Taken from RZ.
in value added
External  financial  External financial  dependence of US firms by ISIC sector over the period  1980-89.  Source: Compustat. Taken from RZ.
dependence (US)
Sales  growth (US)  Real annual growth in sales of US finns by ISIC sector over the period  1980-89. Source:  Compustat. Taken from Fisman
and Love (2002b).
Tobin's Q  (US)  Tobin's Q of US firns by ISIC sector over the period  1980-89. Tobin's Q is defined as the sum of the market value of
equity plus the book value of liabilities over the book value of total assets. Source:  Compustat.
Intangible-to-fixed  Ratio of intangible assets to net fixed assets of US firms by ISIC sector over the period  1980-89. Source:  Compustat (US).
assets (US)  Intangibles is Compustat item 33 and represents the net value of intangible assets. Intangibles are assets  that have no
physical existence  in themselves, but represent rights to enjoy some privilege. In Compustat, this item includes: blueprints
or building designs,  patents, copyrights,  trademarks, franchises, organizational  costs, client lists, computer  software patent
costs, licenses, and goodwill  (except on unconsolidated  subsidiaries).  Intangibles excludes  goodwill on unconsolidated
subsidiaries, which are  included in Investments and Advances under the  Equity Method (Compustat item 31). Net fixed
assets  is Compustat  item 8 and represents net property,  plant and equipment,  which equals gross property, plant and
equipment (Compustat item 7) less accumulated depreciation,  depletion and amortization (Compustat item 196).
36Table 2  Stability of property rights measures over time
This table reports for each of the three property rights indexes the sample mean and standard deviation for the first year
and the last year of the sample period  across all sampled countries, the t-statistic  for a test of difference  in the sample
means  assuming  unequal  variances, the  rank order  correlation coefficient  and a test of independence  of the property
rights indexes in the first year and the last year of the sample period. The null hypothesis of the test of independence is
that  the property  rights  indexes  are  independent.  The  sources  and  definitions  of the  data  are  reported  in  Table  1.
Significance levels a  b and c correspond to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
Statistics across countries:  Test of  difference  Rank order  Test of
in means  correlation  independence
Property rights index  Year  Mean  Standard  Number of  t-statistic  Spearmnan's rho  p-value
deviation  observations
Property (Freedom)  1995  3.93  0.96  44
Property (Freedom)  2000  3.89  0.97  44  -0.22  0.90  O.OOOa
Intellectual  property (301)  1990  4.29  0.60  28
Intellectual property (301)  2000  4.03  0.81  28  -1.36  0.76  00.o0
Patents (GP)  1980  2.69  0.91  44
Patents (GP)  1990  2.74  1.00  44  0.29  0.97  0.OOOa
37Table 3  Summary statistics of institutional  variables
This table reports sunmmary statistics of the variables used in our study. For each  variable,  we report the mean across all
sampled countries, across  developing countries and across developed  countries.  To classify countries  as developing  or
developed,  we use the World Bank classification  of countries.  For comparison purposes, we  also present t-statistics of
tests of differences  in the means of the variables  across  developing  and across developed  countries.  The sources  and
definitions  of the data are reported in Table 1. Significance  levels a, b and ' correspond to one percent,  five percent and
ten percent respectively.
Means across  countries:  t-Tests of  difference in means
Developed  Developing  All countries  Developed versus Developing
countries  countries  countries (t-statistics)
Property (Freedom)  4.68  3.42  3.96  7.10a
Intellectual property (301)  4.47  3.74  4.12  3.97a
Patents (GP)  3.33  2.20  2.67  5.44a
Property (WEF)  6.11  4.69  5.33  7.668
Intellectual property (WEF)  5.74  3.47  4.51  10.64a
Property (ICRG)  9.14  5.42  7.03  1  .82a
Private credit-to-GDP  0.49  0.26  0.36  4.37a
Market cap-to-GDP  0.24  0.17  0.20  0.64
Law and order  9.23  4.40  6.67  11  74a
Accounting standards  0.65  0.66  0.65  -0.12
Settler mortality rate  0.55  4.36  2.48  _11.19a
Human capital  7.92  4.07  5.84  5.72a
GDP per capita  9.04  6.84  7.79  10.28'
Number of countries  19  25  44
38Table 4  Benchmark US Intangible-to-Fixed  assets ratio
The table reports intangible-to-net fixed assets ratios  for each sector are averages for all US firmns in the Compustat
f(US) database for the period 1980-89.  For external financial dependency benchmarks  across sectors we refer to the
original source: Table I in Rajan and Zingales (1998). The table also reports the number of US firms used to construct
the benchnark for each industrial sector. As in Rajan and Zingales (1998)  we focus on manufacturing firms and use
1980s data to construct the benchmarks.  The total number of firms is 5,241.
SIC Code  Industrial sectors  Intangibles-to-fixed assets  Number of firms
20  Food and kindred products  0.75  304
21  Tobacco manufactures  0.49  21
22  Textile  nill products  0.21  131
23  Apparel and other textile products  0.53  139
24  Lumber and wood products  1.20  97
25  Furniture and fixtures  0.49  87
26  Paper and allied products  0.20  130
27  Printing and publishing  4.54  202
28  Chernicals and allied products  0.96  556
29  Petroleum  and coal products  0.02  86
30  Rubber and miscellaneous plastics  0.46  191
31  Leather and leather products  0.33  41
32  Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products  0.05  96
33  Primary metal  industries  0.11  191
34  Fabricated  metal products  0.31  277
35  Industrial machinery and equipment  0.25  795
36  Electrical and electronic equipment  0.77  815
37  Transportation equipment  0.24  262
38  Instruments  and related products  0.90  660
39  Miscellaneous manufacturing  industries  2.29  160
Mean  0.76
Median  0.48
Standard deviation  1.03
39Table 5  Growth, financial dependence,  property rights and intangible assets
Dependent variable  is the real growth in value added of a particular sector in a particular country. Table I describes  all variables in detail. As measure for protection of  prop_rty rights
we  use  the property  rights index  from the  Index of Econornic  Freedom  from the  Heritage  Foundation.  All regressions  include  industry dummies  and a constant but these  are not
reported.  Models (l)-(3)  and models (6)-(8)  include  country dummies but these are not reported.  Models (4)  and (5)  include country-specific variables  rather  than country dunmmies.
Model 6 uses legal origin as IV for property rights. Model 7 uses European settler mortality as IV for property rights. Model 8 uses legal  origin and European settler mortality as IV for
property rights.  Model  9 uses  legal  origin  as IV  for private  credit-to-GDP  and European  settler  mortality  as  IV for property  rights.  Robust  standard  errors  are  shown  below the
coefficients. United States is dropped as it is the benchmark  Significance levels a b and c  correspond  to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
IV legal  IV  IV legal  IV legal
origin  mortality  origin and  origin and
mortality  mortality
Fraction of sector in value added of manufacturing  in 1980  -1.041'  -.9721'  -1.076'  -1.040'  -.45118  -.9672'  -.97202  -.9646'  -1.036'
(.2454)  (.2482)  (.2491)  (.2210)  (.1028)  (.2480)  (.2762)  (.2743)  (.2765)
Private credit-to-GDP  * Extemal financial dependence  (US)  .1401'  .1354'  .1376a  .0509'  .1023'
(.0383)  (.0376)  (.0380)  (.0204)  (.0379)
Property  *Intangible-to-fixed assets (US)  .0103'  .0092'  .0091'  .0067'  .0090'  .0182'  .0166'  .0162'
(.0029)  (.0028)  (.0033)  (.0024)  (.0033)  (.0054)  (.0049)  (.0051)
Private credit-to-GDP  -. 0213  .0488'
(.0163)  (.0151)
Property  -.0004  .0030
(.0050)  (.0058)
Stock market capitalization-to-GDP  .0253'
(.0068)
Human Capital (Schooling)  -.0008
(.0017)
Rule of law  .0019
(.0022)
Accounting standards  .042gb
(.0180)
Log of per-capita GDP  -.0205'
(.0043)
R 2 .2711  .2548  .2757  .1028  .2386  .2547  .2188  .2201  .2277
N  1242  1277  1242  1242  830  1277  1071  1071  1040
Number of countries  44  44  44  44  33  44  37  37  37
40Table 6  Growth in average size and number of establishments
The dependent variable  is either the growth  in average size or the growth in the number of establishments of a particular sector  in a particular country. Table I describes all variables in
detail. All regressions include  industry dumrnmies,  country dummies and a constant but these  are not reported.  Models 3 and 4 use legal origin as IV for property rights. Models 5 and 6
use European  settler mortality as IV for property rights. Models 7 and 8 use legal origin as IV for private credit-to-GDP  and European settler mortality as IV for property rights.  Robust
standard  errors  are shown below the coefficients.  United  States is dropped  as it is the benchmark.  For Costa Rica,  France, Indonesia,  Italy, Jamaica,  Netherlands,  South Africa,  and
Zimbabwe  we  do not have  data on  the growth  of the average  size and the number of establishments.  Significance levels  a,  b and ' correspond  to one percent,  five percent  and ten
percent respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth
average size  number  average size  number  average size  number  average  size  number
IV legal  IV legal  IV mortality  IV mortality  IV legal  IV legal
origin  origin  origin and  origin and
mortality  mortality
Fraction of sector in value added of manufacturing  in  1980  -.8687T  3399b  -.8396'  -.3038c  -1.020  -.2466  -1.039'  -.2610
(.3131)  (.1702)  (.3143)  (.1624)  (.3304)  (.1582)  (.3278)  (.1652)
Private credit-to-GDP  * External financial dependence (US)  .0856'  .0 4 8 0b  .0969'  .0287
(.0289)  (.0220)  (.0322)  (.0290)
Property  *Intangible-to-fixed  assets (US)  .0001  .0069*  -.0007  .0082b  .0057  .0127a  .0030  .01272
(.0021)  (.0022)  (.0036)  (.0034)  (.0040)  (.0050)  (.0034)  (.0049)
R 2 .4329  .3656  .4164  .3619  .4208  .3805  .4580  .3815
N  1071  1104  1100  1133  912  943  887  918
Number of countries  36  36  36  36  30  30  30  30
41Table 7  Growth, financial dependence,  property rights and intangible assets - Alternative measures of property rights
The dependent variable  in all regressions  is the real  growth in value added of a particular sector in a particular country. Table I describes all variables in detail. We use  five altemative
measures  for protection of property  rights.  First, we use a measure for protection of intellectual  property rights which is calculated using the "Special 301"  placements of Office of the
US Trade  Representative.  We  use the median  rating during  1990-1999.  Second,  we use  the patent rights index by Ginarte and Park (1997).  We use the rating  for the year  1980.  A
higher rating of the patent rights index indicates  more protection of patent rights.  Third, we use the property rights index of the World Economic Forum.  We use the rating for the year
2001.  Fourth, we use the intellectual  property rights index of the World Economic  Forum.  We use the rating for the year 2001. Fifth, we use the property rights index of Knack and
Keefer (1995).  Average over 1982-95.  AU regressions  include industry dummies,  country dummies and a constant but these are not reported.  Robust  standard errors are shown below
the coefficients.  United States is dropped as it is the benchmark. Significance levels n, b and ' correspond to one percent,  five percent and ten percent respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Fraction of sector in value  added of manufacturing in 1980  -.5225'  -.9592'  -1.053'  -1.055'  -.9802'  -.5708'  -1.064'  -1.139'  -1.141'  -1.082'
(.1561)  (.2449)  (.2655)  (.2659)  (.2493)  (.1625)  (.2458)  (.2652)  (.2656)  (.2503)
Private credit-to-GDP  * External financial dependence  (US)  .0740'  .1357'  .1355'  .1360'  .1353'
(.0252)  (.0382)  (.0389)  (.0390)  (.0376)
Intellectual  property (301)  *Intangible-to-fixed assets (US)  .0062'  .0051b
(.0023)  (.0021)
Patents (GP)  *Intangible-to-fixed assets (US)  .0074'  .0066'
(.0026)  (.0026)
Property (WEF) 'Intangible-to-fixed  assets (US)  .0109'  .0093'
(.0029)  (.0027)
Intellectual property (WEF) 'Intangible-to-fixed  assets (US)  .0072'  .0062'
(.0019)  (.0018)
Property (ICRG)  'Intangible-to-fixed assets (US)  .0043'  .0037'
(.0012)  (.0012)
R2  .3269  .2521  .2581  .2575  .2548  .3592  .2734  .2789  .2786  .2755
N  1119  1277  1211  1211  1277  1090  1242  1179  1179  1242
Number of countries  36  44  42  42  44  36  44  41  41  44
42Table 8  Growth,  financial dependence, property rights and intangible assets - Robustness tests
The dependent  variable in all regressions is the real growth in value added of a particular sector in a particular country. Table I describes  all variables in detail. All regressions  include industry dumnies,  country  dummnies  and  a constant  but  these  are  not  reported.  Robust standard  errors  are shown  below  the  coefficients.  Models  (9)-(1I)  include  only  those observations  for which Property rights index  takes value 3, resp. 4, resp. 5. United States is dropped as it is the benchmark.  Significance levels a,  b and C correspond  to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)
PROP=3  PROP=4  PROP=5
Fraction of sector in value added of manufacturing in  1980  -1.076'  -1.071'  -1.074'  -1.072'  -1.068'  -1.064'  -1.066^  -1.077  -1.466'  -.9445'  -.2194'
(.2491)  (.2496)  (.2471)  (.2478)  (.2510)  (.2522)  (.2528)  (.2503)  (.2255)  (.3819)  (.1178)
Private credit-to-GDP  *  External  financial dependence (US)  .1354'  .0649  .0896'  .0617  .1176a  .1124'  .1183'  .1353'
(.0376)  (.0458)  (.0338)  (.0457)  (.0364)  (.0324)  (.0364)  (.0376)
Private credit-to-GDP  * Sales growth (US)  1.170'  .5671
(.6806)  (.5426)
Private credit-to-GDP  * Tobin's Q (US)  .0318  -.0136
(.0430)  (.0363)
Property *Intangible-to-fixed  assets (US)  .0092'  .0075'  .0048'  .0046'  .0088'  .0071'  .0071 '  .0 086b
(.0028)  (.0025)  (.0026)  (.0026)  (.0028)  (.0028)  (.0028)  (.0038)
Property  *Sales growth (US)  .3 377b  .2915'
(.1731)  (.1612)
Property *  Tobin's  Q (US)  .0185  .0198
(.0129)  (.0133)
Per capita GDP  1980 *Intangible-to-fixed  assets (US)  .0005  -. 0049  .0027  .0056
(.0022)  (.0046)  (.0023)  (.0045)
R 2  .2757  .2793  .2832  .2839  .2761  .2783  .2784  .2757  .3030  .3781  .4546
N  1242  1242  1242  1242  1242  1242  1242  1242  387  381  471
Number ofcountries  44  44  44  44  44  44  44  44  14  13  15
43Annex Table  1  Correlation matrix of property rights indexes
p-values are in parentheses.  Significance levels a,b and ' correspond to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
Property  Intellectual  Patents  Property rights  Intellectual  Property




Intellectual  property  0.48708  1.000a
(301)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Patents  0.6260a  0.4437a  1.000a
(GP)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Property  0.7668a  0.5394a  0.68528  1.0008
(WEF)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Intellectual  property  0.78148  0.6506a  0.7170a  0.94878  1.000a
(WEF)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Property  0.78218  0.56228  0.68680  0.86908  0.9308a  1.0008
(ICRG)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
44Annex Table 2  Country-specific  data
This table reports several variables for the countries studied. Countries are sorted  in ascending  alphabetical  order.  n.a. is not available.  More detail on the definitions  and sources of the
variables  can be found in Table 1.
Intellectual  Intellectual  European
Property  property  Patents  Property  property  Property  Private  Market  Human  Rule of  Legal  Settler  GDP per
Country  Developing  (Freedom)  (301)  (GP)  (WEF)  (WEF)  (ICRG)  credit  cap  Accounting  capital  law  origin  Mortality  capita
Australia  0  5.00  4.00  3.23  6.20  6.00  9.30  0.28  0.38  0.70  10.08  10.00  1.00  2.15  9.20
Austria  0  5.00  5.00  3.81  6.40  6.20  9.45  0.77  0.03  0.48  6.22  10.00  3.00  0.00  9.16
Bangladesh  1  2.00  n.a.  1.99  3.70  2.20  2.85  0.07  0.00  n.a.  1.68  n.a.  1.00  4.27  4.79
Belgium  0  5.00  5.00  3.38  5.90  5.50  9.58  0.29  0.09  0.63  8.79  10.00  2.00  0.00  9.33
Brazil  1  3.00  3.00  1.85  5.00  4.10  6.64  0.23  0.05  0.69  2.98  6.32  2.00  4.26  7.41
Canada  0  5.00  4.00  2.76  6.20  5.80  9.73  0.45  0.46  0.68  10.16  10.00  1.00  2.78  9.26
Chile  1  5.00  4.00  2.41  5.60  4.20  6.44  0.36  0.34  0.60  5.99  7.02  2.00  4.23  7.84
Colombia  1  3.00  4.00  1.12  4.30  3.00  5.54  0.14  0.05  0.39  4.23  2.08  2.00  4.26  7.05
Costa Rica  1  3.00  n.a.  1.94  5.20  3.70  6.47  0.26  0.04  n.a.  4.81  n.a.  2.00  4.36  7.68
Denmark  0  5.00  5.00  3.62  6.40  6.30  9.80  0.42  0.09  0.62  10.14  10.00  4.00  0.00  9.41
Egypt  1  3.00  3.00  1.99  5.60  4.10  4.96  0.21  0.01  n.a.  2.16  4.17  2.00  4.22  6.33
Finland  0  5.00  5.00  2.95  6.50  6.40  9.76  0.48  0.06  0.71  9.61  10.00  4.00  0.00  9.23
France  0  4.00  5.00  3.90  6.40  6.60  9.37  0.54  0.10  0.76  5.97  8.98  2.00  0.00  9.34
Germany  0  5.00  5.00  3.86  6.50  6.30  9.55  0.78  0.09  0.68  8.46  9.23  3.00  0.00  9.42
Greece  0  4.00  3.00  2.46  5.00  3.90  6.56  0.44  0.08  0.44  6.56  6.18  2.00  0.00  8.25
India  1  3.00  3.00  1.62  4.90  3.00  5.80  0.24  0.05  0.71  2.72  4.17  1.00  3.88  5.48
Indonesia  1  3.00  4.00  0.33  3.80  2.90  4.38  0.20  0.00  n.a.  3.09  3.98  2.00  5.14  6.21
Israel  1  4.00  4.00  3.57  6.30  4.90  7.22  0.67  0.35  n.a.  9.14  4.82  1.00  n.a.  8.18
Italy  0  4.00  4.00  3.71  6.20  5.70  8.07  0.42  0.07  0.69  5.83  8.33  2.00  0.00  8.77
Jamaica  1  4.00  n.a.  2.86  4.90  3.50  5.05  0.15  0.02  n.a.  3.60  n.a.  1.00  4.87  7.11
Japan  0  5.00  4.00  3.94  6.10  5.50  9.34  0.86  0.30  0.67  8.17  8.98  3.00  n.a.  9.20
Jordan  1  4.00  4.50  1.86  5.80  4.60  5.15  0.54  0.50  n.a.  2.93  4.35  2.00  n.a.  7.01
Kenya  1  3.00  n.a.  2.57  n.a.  n.a.  5.58  0.20  0.00  n.a.  2.44  5.42  1.00  4.98  6.03
Korea, Rep. of  1  5.00  3.00  3.28  4.70  4.00  6.90  0.50  0.08  n.a.  6.85  5.35  3.00  n.a.  7.25
Malaysia  1  4.00  4.00  2.57  5.20  3.50  7.09  0.48  0.65  0.78  4.49  6.78  1.00  2.87  7.43
Mexico  1  3.00  4.00  1.40  4.60  3.60  5.76  0.16  0.07  n.a.  3.51  5.35  2.00  4.26  7.88
Morocco  1  3.50  n.a.  2.38  n.a.  n.a.  5.05  0.16  0.02  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.00  4.36  6.69
Netherlands  0  5.00  5.00  4.24  6.50  6.50  9.87  0.60  0.19  0.73  8.20  10.00  2.00  0.00  9.32
New Zealand  0  5.00  4.00  3.32  5.90  5.30  9.80  0.19  0.33  0.61  12.14  10.00  1.00  2.15  8.92
Nigeria  1  3.00  n.a.  3.05  3.80  2.50  3.85  0.12  n.a.  0.62  n.a.  2.73  1.00  7.60  6.81
45Norway  0  5.00  5.00  329  5.90  5.30  9.69  0.34  0.06  0.71  10.32  10.00  4.00  0.00  9.51
Pakistan  1  4.00  4.00  1.99  n.a.  n.a.  4.21  0.25  0.03  0.69  1.74  3.03  1.00  3.61  5.67
Peru  1  3.00  4.00  1.02  4.10  3.00  4.19  0.11  0.06  n.a.  5.44  2.50  2.00  4.26  6.74
Philippines  1  4.00  4.00  2.67  4.30  2.90  3.62  0.28  0.10  0.63  6.00  2.73  2.00  n.a.  6.59
Portugal  0  4.00  5.00  1.98  5.30  4.90  7.94  0.52  0.01  0.52  3.23  8.68  2.00  0.00  7.74
Singapore  0  5.00  4 00  2.57  6.50  5.60  8.69  0.57  1.62  0.73  3.69  8.57  1.00  2.87  8.45
South Africa  1  3.00  4.00  3.57  5.30  4.50  7.50  0.26  1.20  0.81  4.61  4.42  1.00  2.74  7.97
Spain  0  4.00  4.00  3.29  5.90  5.30  7.99  0.76  0.09  0.42  5.15  7.80  2.00  0.00  8.53
Sri  Lanka  1  3.00  n.a.  2.79  4.20  3.10  4.64  0.21  0.06  n.a.  5.18  1.90  1.00  4.25  5.53
Sweden  0  4.00  4.00  3.47  5.90  5.80  9.80  0.42  0.11  0.81  9.47  10.00  4.00  0.00  9.57
Turkey  1  4.00  3.00  1.80  4.20  3.10  5.76  0.14  0.01  n.a.  2.62  5.18  2.00  n.a.  6.99
UK  0  5.00  5.00  3.57  6.30  6.10  9.40  0.25  0.38  0.80  8.35  8.57  1.00  0.00  9.17
Venezuela  1  3.00  4.00  1.35  3.80  3.00  5.82  0.30  0.05  n.a.  4.93  6.37  2.00  4.36  8.29
Zimbabwe  1  3.00  n.a.  2.90  3.90  2.90  5.09  0.30  0.45  na.  2.40  3.68  1.00  n.a.  6.09
Average  0.57  3.96  4.12  2.67  5.33  4.51  7.03  0.36  0.20  0.65  5.84  6.67  1.91  2.48  7.79
46Annex Table 3  Summary statistics and correlation matrix of main explanatory variables
Summary statistics
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation  Country-industry
Observations
Private Credit *  0.1136  0.1767  1,504
External Dependency
Property (Freedom)*  2.5328  3.3133  1,547
Intangible-to-fixed  assets
Intellectual  property (301)*  2.6138  3.3641  1,289
Intangible-to-fixed  assets
Patents (GP)*  1.7085  2.3510  1,547
Intangible-to-fixed  assets
Property (WEF)*  3.3983  4.3887  1,454
Intangible-to-fixed  assets
Intellectual property (WEF)*  2.8697  3.8636  1,454
Intangible-to-fixed  assets
Property (ICRG)  4.4914  6.0588  1,547
Intangible-to-fixed  assets
Correlation matrix of main explanatory variables
Private  Property  Intellectual  Patent rights  Property  Intellectual  Property
Credit*  (Freedom)*  property  (GP)*  (WEF)*  property  (ICRG)*
External  Intangible-to-  (301)*  Intangible-to-  Intangible-to-  (WEF)*  Intangible-to-
Dependency  fixed assets  Intangible-to-  fixed assets  fixed assets  Intangible-to-  fixed assets
fixed assets  fixed assets
Private Credit  .OO0
Extemal  (0.00)
Dependency
Property  0.1494  1.000a
(Freedom)*  (0.00)  (0.00)
Intangible-to-
fixed assets
Intellectual  0.1336a  0.9746a  1.000a
property (301)*  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Intangible-to-
fixed assets
Patent rights  0.1620a  0.9514a  0.9264a  1.000a
(GP)*  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Intangible-to-
fixed assets
Property (WEF)*  0.1483a  0.98468  0.9819a  0.9539a  I.00Oa
Intangible-to-  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
fixed assets
Intellectual  0.16448  0.97618  0.9714a  0.95898  0.9866a  1.000a
property (WEF)*  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Intangible-to-
fixed assets
Property(ICRG)*  0.1611a  0.9743a  0.9638a  0.95478  0.97998  0.99148  1.000a
Intangible-to-  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
fixed assets
p-values are in parentheses.  Significance levels 8,b  and c correspond to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
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